Second-order free-riding problem solved? (reply)

Karthik Panchanathan () and Rob Boyd
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Karthik Panchanathan: Center for Behavior, Evolution, University of California
Rob Boyd: Center for Behavior, Evolution, University of California

Nature, 2005, vol. 437, issue 7058, E8-E9

Abstract: Abstract We have shown that, if a system of indirect reciprocity is stable, exclusion from that system could deter collective-action cheats1. Unlike direct punishment2,3,4,5, indirect punishers benefit by avoiding donation, obviating the second-order free-rider problem. Fowler claims6, however, that we assume away the second-order free-rider problem, and (by adding a new error term) argues that indirect-reciprocity defectors undermine cooperation.

Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1038/nature04202

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