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Evolution of cooperation in a finite homogeneous graph

Peter D. Taylor (), Troy Day and Geoff Wild
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Peter D. Taylor: Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada
Troy Day: Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada
Geoff Wild: Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada

Nature, 2007, vol. 447, issue 7143, 469-472

Abstract: This study bridges two theoretical approaches to model the evolution of cooperation: inclusive fitness models and evolutionary game theory. Simple analytical conditions are found for the evolution of cooperation for a large class of graphs.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1038/nature05784

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