Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment

Hisashi Ohtsuki (), Yoh Iwasa and Martin A. Nowak
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Hisashi Ohtsuki: Tokyo Institute of Technology
Yoh Iwasa: Faculty of Sciences, Kyushu University
Martin A. Nowak: Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA

Nature, 2009, vol. 457, issue 7225, 79-82

Abstract: Reasons to be nice In human societies, altruistic behaviour can evolve when those who fail to co-operate acquire a bad reputation. But how far is it sensible to go on punishing those who don't cooperate, as punishment incurs a cost for both the punisher and the punished? Ohtsuki et al. explore the circumstances under which punishment is favoured using a game theory model in which all individuals observe the interactions between others and assess their reputation according to various social norms. They find that costly punishment can facilitate the evolution of cooperation, but only under a narrow set of parameters. As indirect reciprocity evolves to become more effective, costly punishment is rendered inefficient.

Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1038/nature07601

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