Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons

Karl Sigmund (), Hannelore De Silva, Arne Traulsen and Christoph Hauert
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Karl Sigmund: Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna
Hannelore De Silva: WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business)
Arne Traulsen: Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology
Christoph Hauert: University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British ColumbiaV6T 1Z2, Canada

Nature, 2010, vol. 466, issue 7308, 861-863

Abstract: Cooperation in evolutionary games can be stabilized through punishment of non-cooperators, at a cost to those who do the punishing. Punishment can take different forms, in particular peer-punishment, in which individuals punish free-riders after the event, and pool-punishment, in which a fund for sanctioning is set up beforehand. These authors show that pool-punishment is superior to peer-punishment in dealing with second-order free-riders, who cooperate in the main game but refuse to contribute to punishment.

Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1038/nature09203

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