Social norm complexity and past reputations in the evolution of cooperation

Fernando P. Santos, Francisco C. Santos and Jorge M. Pacheco ()
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Fernando P. Santos: INESC-ID and Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, IST-Taguspark
Francisco C. Santos: INESC-ID and Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, IST-Taguspark
Jorge M. Pacheco: ATP-group

Nature, 2018, vol. 555, issue 7695, 242-245

Abstract: In a binary decision game in which players strategically help certain individuals but not others, simple moral principles maximize cooperation, even when including the historical reputations of players.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1038/nature25763

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