Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games

Christian Hilbe (), Štěpán Šimsa, Krishnendu Chatterjee () and Martin A. Nowak ()
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Christian Hilbe: Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University
Štěpán Šimsa: Faculty of Mathematics and Physics, Charles University
Krishnendu Chatterjee: IST Austria
Martin A. Nowak: Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University

Nature, 2018, vol. 559, issue 7713, 246-249

Abstract: Abstract Social dilemmas occur when incentives for individuals are misaligned with group interests1–7. According to the ‘tragedy of the commons’, these misalignments can lead to overexploitation and collapse of public resources. The resulting behaviours can be analysed with the tools of game theory8. The theory of direct reciprocity9–15 suggests that repeated interactions can alleviate such dilemmas, but previous work has assumed that the public resource remains constant over time. Here we introduce the idea that the public resource is instead changeable and depends on the strategic choices of individuals. An intuitive scenario is that cooperation increases the public resource, whereas defection decreases it. Thus, cooperation allows the possibility of playing a more valuable game with higher payoffs, whereas defection leads to a less valuable game. We analyse this idea using the theory of stochastic games16–19 and evolutionary game theory. We find that the dependence of the public resource on previous interactions can greatly enhance the propensity for cooperation. For these results, the interaction between reciprocity and payoff feedback is crucial: neither repeated interactions in a constant environment nor single interactions in a changing environment yield similar cooperation rates. Our framework shows which feedbacks between exploitation and environment—either naturally occurring or designed—help to overcome social dilemmas.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x

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