Evolutionary Game Theory and Economics. Part 1. Optimality Principles and Models of Behavior Dynamics

A. Vasin
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A. Vasin: The Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia

Journal of the New Economic Association, 2009, issue 3-4, 10-27

Abstract: The paper discusses basic concepts of the evolutionary game theory and provides a survey of the most important applications to modeling of economic behavior. We expound the foundation for application of the Nash equilibrium concept to agents with bounded rationality and incomplete information. We discuss models of formation of payoff functions, or evolution of preferences.

Keywords: Evolutionary stable strategy; replicator dynamics; adaptive dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nea:journl:y:2009:i:3-4:p:10-27

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