Evolutionary Game Theory and Economics. Part 2. Stability of Equilibria. Special Features of Human Behavior Evolution

A. Vasin
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A. Vasin: The Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia

Journal of the New Economic Association, 2010, issue 5, 10-27

Abstract: The paper discusses convergence of evolutionary dynamics to mixed equiliria including different behavior strategies. Models of cooperative and altruistic behavior spreading are considered. The paper reveals special features of human behavior evolution in comparison with behavior in biological populations.

Keywords: Mixed equilibrium; convergence; cooperation; altruism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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