Mechanisms for Corruption Suppression

A. Vasin, P. Nikolaev and A. Urazov
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A. Vasin: Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
P. Nikolaev: Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
A. Urazov: Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia

Journal of the New Economic Association, 2011, issue 10, 10-30

Abstract: Government agencies and large corporations meet similar problems related to control of agents dealing with outsiders: citizens under audit of the agency or clients of the company. In such interaction there typically exists a possibility of collusion. In order to prevent it, agencies and corporations usually organize hierarchical controlling structures. The present paper considers game-theoretic models of such structures and examines a problem of their optimal organization.

Keywords: corruption; hierarchical structures; game-theoretic model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nea:journl:y:2011:i:10:p:10-30

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