Corporate Board Elections and Company's Performance

Alexander Karpov

Journal of the New Economic Association, 2012, vol. 16, issue 4, 10-25

Abstract: This paper surveys models of cumulative voting in corporate elections that have appeared in the literature. The influence of cumulative voting on company performance and proxy contests is analyzed. The practical issues as well as theoretical aspects of cumulative voting are studied. The particular section is devoted to gametheoretical modeling of the cumulative voting for corporate directors.

Keywords: board of directors; corporate governance; cumulative voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nea:journl:y:2012:i:16:p:10-25

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