Analysis of the Short-Term Efficiency of Mechanisms of the Wholesale Electricity Market

A. Vasin and E. Daylova
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A. Vasin: Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
E. Daylova: Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia

Journal of the New Economic Association, 2013, vol. 18, issue 2, 35-60

Abstract: The authors consider theoretical models for mechanisms of the wholesale electricity market. Among them: Cournot auction, first-price auction of supply functions, Vickrey auction, pay-as-bid auction, two-stage auction. Theoretical estimations of their short-term efficiency from social welfare viewpoint as well as prices of goods for consumers are compared with results of statistical researches. Some problems and prospects of the Russian electricity market pointed out.

Keywords: electricity markets; Cournot auction; supply function auction; Vickrey auction; pay-as-bid auction; forward market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D44 Q40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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