Models of Imperfect Competition in Analysis of Siberian Electricity Market

N. Ayzenberg, N. Kiseleva and V. Zorkaltsev
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N. Ayzenberg: Melentiev Energy Systems Institute SB RAS, Irkutsk, Russia
N. Kiseleva: Melentiev Energy Systems Institute SB RAS, Irkutsk, Russia
V. Zorkaltsev: Melentiev Energy Systems Institute SB RAS, Irkutsk, Russia

Journal of the New Economic Association, 2013, vol. 18, issue 2, 62-88

Abstract: The authors consider mechanisms of organizing auctions in the electricity market that are based on submitting bids of energy consumers and offers of energy producers to the market operator. The authors discuss and compare possible strategies of energy generators’ behavior that lead to different equilibrium situations such as Cournot model, supply function equilibrium, and perfectly competitive equilibrium. The mechanisms are tested on the basis of the Siberian electric power system.

Keywords: electricity market; models of imperfect markets; oligopoly; model of supply function equilibrium; liberalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L52 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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