Competition Restriction Problem in the Markets Linked to the Markets of Essential Facilities

Svetlana Golovanova

Journal of the New Economic Association, 2013, vol. 20, issue 4, 110-132

Abstract: Theoretical background for reasons that cause the owner of essential facilities to restrict competition in downstream markets provided. Examining the particular Russian antitrust cases the author discusses whether the essential facilities doctrine may be helpful to solve the problem. While the doctrine seems to be quite efficient when considering infrastructure industries its use in other cases is disputable due to the high risk of type I errors (punishment of the innocents).

Keywords: essential facilities; competition; antitrust policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K23 L42 L43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nea:journl:y:2013:i:20:p:110-132

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