Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy: Seeking for a Better Balance
Andrey Shastitko and
Alexander Kurdin ()
Journal of the New Economic Association, 2014, vol. 21, issue 1, 111-135
Competition policy and intellectual property rights (IPR) protection policy play a significant role in the innovation-based economic development. The authors of this work consider different combinations of these policies through the lens of discrete structural alternatives assuming opportunities for different regimes of IPR protection, as well as for antitrust. The analysis is focused on 4 main alternatives: strong and weak IPR protection, on the one hand, and two types of competition policy, based on a possible introduction of compulsory licensing, on the other hand. The result of the analysis shows that the introduction of compulsory licensing under a weak IPR protection weakens incentives for innovations.
Keywords: competition policy; antitrust policy; compulsory licensing; intellectual property rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L40 O34 K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nea:journl:y:2014:i:21:p:111-135
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