Psychological Games in the Theory of Choice: Temptation, Perfectionism, Self-deception

Fyodor Zak

Journal of the New Economic Association, 2014, vol. 21, issue 1, 12-32

Abstract: In this paper we give a survey of recent work on game theory devoted to modeling decision making under bounded rationality. An agent's deviation from rational choice understood as maximization of gain can be caused by moral principles (religious beliefs, altruism, patriotism), emotions (envy, wrath, shame, regret, or guilt) or simply by an attempt to comply with several criteria not reducible to a single one. In the first part of the survey we consider the behavior of agents subject to temptation, perfectionists, and persons susceptible to self-deceit.

Keywords: binary relation; preferences; utility function; two-period choice model; set betweenness axiom; temptation; self-control; perfectionism; self-deceit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 C79 D11 D31 D61 D63 D64 D80 D81 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nea:journl:y:2014:i:21:p:12-32

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