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Psychological Games in the Theory of Choice. II. Shame, Regret, Egoism and Altruism

Fyodor Zak

Journal of the New Economic Association, 2014, vol. 22, issue 2, 12-40

Abstract: In this paper we give a survey of recent works on game theory devoted to modeling of decision making process under bounded rationality. An agent's deviation from rational choice understood as maximization of gain can be caused by moral principles (religious beliefs, altruism, patriotism), emotions (envy, wrath, shame, regret, or guilt) or simply by an attempt to comply with several estimation criteria not reducible to a single one. In the second part of the survey we consider the behavior of agents subject to shame and regret, egoists and altruists, and study bargaining solutions in multicriteria settings.

Keywords: binary preference relation; utility function; two-period choice model; set betweenness axiom; shame; regret; egoism; altruism; attraction; compromise; fallback bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 C79 D11 D31 D61 D63 D64 D80 D81 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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