Why Reforms Fail

V. Polterovich
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V. Polterovich: CEMI RAS, Moscow, Russia
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Виктор Меерович Полтерович

Journal of the New Economic Association, 2014, vol. 23, issue 3, 169-173

Abstract: Failure of reforms is typical, and a success is extremely rare. This article analyzes the causes of this phenomenon. Many reform proposals are based on mistakable postulates concerning, in particular, interconnections of economic and political institutions. Reform often used as a tool for rent seeking and administrative struggle, hampering social welfare growth. Finally, the most important cause of the failure is the expert community underdevelopment, which is supported by the prevailing system of the reform preparation. This system leads to conflicts of interest and does not promote higher qualification of experts, so that there is a kind of analogue with institutional trap. To exit from the "bad equilibrium", it is advisable to seek the adoption of regulations for the reform designing, the formation of specialized expert institutions with long-term financing and introduction of open competitive procedures for the selection of projects.

Keywords: institutions; sequence of reforms; democratization; rent seeking; institutional trap; reform design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 E02 H75 L85 P21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nea:journl:y:2014:i:23:p:169-173

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