 Investing a Risky Projects under the Government Guarantees on LoansJournal of the New Economic Association, 2014, vol. 24, issue 4, 12-37 Abstract: The paper considers the model which allows to study a mechanism of the government loan guarantees for financing risky projects. The project is risky, i.e. after beginning of financing it can fail with some probability, even before starting functioning. To finance the project it is necessary to obtain funds on credit from a bank. Since a risky project has the probability of a failure to return the credit, the interest rate on a credit can be rather high. In order to reduce the interest rate and to stimulate investor the state guarantees a reimbursement for the bank of a part of the loan (if project fails). We propose a game theory optimization approach to deriving a part of loan reimbursement and a credit policy of bank in financing a risky projects. We prove the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium in the game "government-bank-investor" as well as analyze the obtained results and give its economic interpretation. Keywords: investment project; loan; risk; government guarantees; optimal part of loan reimbursement (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nea:journl:y:2014:i:24:p:12-37 Access Statistics for this article Journal of the New Economic Association is currently edited by Victor Polterovich and Aleksandr Rubinshtein More articles in Journal of the New Economic Association from New Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC. |
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