Bilevel models of investment and tax policy formation in the resource region

S. Antzys, S. Lavlinskii, A. Panin and A. Pljasunov
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S. Antzys: Sobolev Institute of Mathematics, Novosibirsk, Russia
S. Lavlinskii: Sobolev Institute of Mathematics, Novosibirsk, Russia
A. Panin: Sobolev Institute of Mathematics, Novosibirsk, Russia
A. Pljasunov: Sobolev Institute of Mathematics, Novosibirsk, Russia

Journal of the New Economic Association, 2020, vol. 48, issue 4, 41-62

Abstract: An analysis is presented of the mechanism of investment and tax policy formation in the resource region, whereby the government provides tax incentives and supports the investor in infrastructure development and, to some extent, in the implementation of mandatory environmental measures. The analysis builds on the bilevel Boolean programming problems. The actual data and dimensions of the model test site capture the specificity of the modeled object and make possible a practical study of the properties of equilibrium solutions. The simulation results indicate the need to take into account the complementarity of investment and tax policies in the strategic planning process. In general, to stimulate private investment, the state should use a full set of tools - to build infrastructure, implement part of the necessary environmental protection measures and provide certain commodity projects with tax incentives of a certain level. The methodology for the formation of such a policy should be based on an analysis of investors' proposals, general plans for the development of the territory and a search for a compromise of the interests of the budget, population and private investor. The field of application of the research results is the development of a scenario for the development of local natural resources, including infrastructure development plans and investment proposal packages containing rules for granting tax incentives.

Keywords: mineral resources development program; investment policy; tax incentives; infrastructure development projects; sharing of natural-resource rents; bilevel mathematical programming problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 H32 Q32 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nea:journl:y:2020:i:48:p:41-62

DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2020-48-4-2

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