Stable systems of schedule contracts

V. Danilov
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V. Danilov: Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

Journal of the New Economic Association, 2021, vol. 51, issue 3, 12-29

Abstract: The paper studies the systems of paired contracts between agents of two complementary groups (workers and firms, students and universities, depositors and banks). Multiple contracts are allowed, as well as flexible contracts when the contract is concluded with some intensity. Agent preferences are described using choice functions. It is shown that if these choice functions satisfy the condition that we call conservativeness, then there are so-called stable systems of contracts, when it is unprofitable for any pair of counterparties to change the concluded contracts. The existence of a stable system of contracts is established using the transfinite process of sequential approximation, which generalizes the classical Gale?Shapley algorithm. As a result, we relieved of the finiteness conditions of the set of contracts. Such properties of stable systems as polarization and latticeness are also studied.

Keywords: choice function; Gale?Shapley algorithm; matching; lattice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D49 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nea:journl:y:2021:i:51:p:12-29

DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2021-51-3-1

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