Vote Buying: Legislatures and Lobbying

Eddie Dekel, Matthew Jackson and Asher Wolinsky

Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2009, vol. 4, issue 2, 103-128

Abstract: We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two lobbyists compete for the votes of legislators by offering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists' budget constraints and legislators' preferences determine the winner and the payments. When lobbyists are budget constrained then the preferences of all legislators can matter, and a lobbyist's relative strength increases more steeply with a budget increase than with an increase of equal magnitude to the legislators' original preferences for this lobbyist's positio. When lobbyists are not budget constrained then only the preferences of near median legislators matter and the preferences of these legislators and the budget enter equally in determining the winner.

Keywords: Vote buying; Lobbying; Legislatures; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Vote Buying II: Legislatures and Lobbying (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00008063

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