Vote Buying II: Legislatures and Lobbying

Eddie Dekel, Matthew Jackson and Asher Wolinksy

No 1433, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this prac- tice were allowed and free of stigma. Two "lobbyists" compete for the votes of legislators by offering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists' budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments.

Keywords: vote buying; lobbying; legislatures; political economy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Vote Buying: Legislatures and Lobbying (2009)
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