Health vs. Economy: Politically Optimal Pandemic Policy

Desiree Desierto and Mark Koyama

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, 2020, vol. 1, issue 4, 645-669

Abstract: Pandemics have heterogeneous effects on the health and economic outcomes of members of the population. To stay in power, politician-policymakers have to consider the health vulnerability–economic vulnerability (HV–EV) profiles of their coalition. We show that the politically optimal pandemic policy (POPP) reveals the HV–EV profile of the smallest, rather than the largest, group in the coalition. The logic of political survival dictates that the preferences of the most pivotal members of the coalition determine policy.

Keywords: Selectorate theory; pandemics; political economy of pandemic policy; COVID-19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Health vs. Economy: Politically Optimal Pandemic Policy (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlpip:113.00000026

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