Comparing Leviathans: Agenda Influence in State Legislatures, 2011 to 2023

Boris Shor and Michael R. Kistner

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, 2024, vol. 4, issue 4, 551-576

Abstract: An extensive literature argues that majority parties function as leviathans (or cartels) that control the agenda, deciding which policies will advance to a vote and which policies will not. However, most studies focus on only a single institution, precluding the development and testing of generalizable theories of agenda influence. We address this gap by introducing new data on agenda control outcomes (both negative and positive) spanning the entirety of state legislatures over a thirteen year period. Using this data, we highlight previously unnoticed patterns in agenda influence, most notably the presence of stark partisan asymmetries. Republican majorities get rolled at approximately four times the rate of Democratic majorities, a finding that holds both across and within institutions. More broadly, we find consistent evidence of greater agenda influence for Democratic majorities, suggesting a need for new theory to explain these differences.

Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlpip:113.00000088

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