Short- and Long-run Effects of External Interventions on Trust

Igor Asanov and Simone Vannuccini

Review of Behavioral Economics, 2020, vol. 7, issue 2, 159-195

Abstract: We analyze experimentally the effects of external interventions such as subsidy and targeting on investment decisions, during an intervention and after. We employ a multi-period version of the trust (investment) game Berg et al. (1995) introducing either monetary incentives for contribution or providing a suggestion about the level of investment. The results of the experiment indicate that targeting is an effective instrument to promote trustful behavior while subsidy policy is effective in neither the short- or the long-run. Therefore, we suggest a targeting policy should be considered as an instrument to foster trustful behavior.

Keywords: Trust game; Experiment; Policy; Subsidy; Academic spin-offs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D80 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/105.000001118 (application/xml)

Related works:
Working Paper: Short- and Long-run Effects of External Interventions on Trust (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlrbe:105.00000118

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Review of Behavioral Economics from now publishers
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucy Wiseman ().