Short- and Long-run Effects of External Interventions on Trust

Igor Asanov and Simone Vannuccini

No 2015-013, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We experimentally analyze the effects of external interventions such as subsidy and targeting on investment decisions during the intervention and after. We employ a multi-period version of the trust (investment) game (Berg et al., 1995) introducing either the monetary incentives for contribution or providing a suggestion about the level of investment. The results of the experiment indicate that targeting is an effective instrument to promote trustful behavior, whereas subsidy policy is not effective both in short- and long-run. Therefore we suggest considering a targeting policy as one of the instruments that can foster trustful behavior.

Keywords: Trust Game; Experiment; Policy; Subsidy; Academic Spin-offs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D80 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Short- and Long-run Effects of External Interventions on Trust (2020)
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