Firm Preferences for Environmental Policy: Industry Uniform or Firm Specific?
Sherzod Akhundjanov () and
Felix Munoz-Garcia ()
Strategic Behavior and the Environment, 2016, vol. 6, issue 1-2, 135-180
This paper examines the effect of uniform and firm-specific environmental regulation on the production decisions, and profits, of polluting and green firms. While both types of regulation increase firms' costs and thus entail a negative effect on profits, firm-specific regulation can also yield a positive effect for relatively inefficient firms by alleviating their cost disadvantage. When such cost disadvantage is sufficiently large, we show that the positive effect of firm-specific regulation dominates its negative effect, leading inefficient (efficient) firms to support (oppose) socially optimal regulation. Furthermore, our findings indicate that such support for environmental policy can originate not only from the most common ally (the green firm) but also from polluting firms.
Keywords: Cost asymmetry; cost disadvantage; emission fees; green firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 D62 H23 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000066
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Strategic Behavior and the Environment from now publishers
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alet Heezemans ().