Spending Within Limits: Evidence From Municipal Fiscal Restraints

Leah Brooks, Yosh Halberstam and Justin Phillips

National Tax Journal, 2016, vol. 69, issue 2, 315-352

Abstract: This paper studies the role of a constitutional rule new to the literature — a limit placed by a city on its own ability to tax or spend. We find that such a limit exists in at least one in eight cities. After limit adoption, municipal revenue growth declines by 13 to 17 percent. Our results suggest that institutional constraints may be effective when representative government falls short of the median voter ideal.

Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Spending within limits: Evidence from municipal fiscal restraints (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:69:y:2016:i:2:p:315-352

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