Market Solutions to Externality Problems: Theory and Practice

Alan Randall

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1972, vol. 54, issue 2, 175-183

Abstract: The concept of market solution to externality problems has received the favorable attention of many economic theorists. Yet, policy practitioners and the general public seem less enthusiastic. Theoretical studies and available empirical work have effectively demolished Coase's doctrine of the allocative neutrality of liability rules. In reality, a full liability law will result in a greater degree of abatement of external diseconomies than will zero or intermediate liability laws. It is suggested that market solutions can be seriously considered in a world with pervasive externalities only if something approaching a full liability rule is established. Even then, excessive transactions costs may limit the success of market solutions.

Date: 1972
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