Generalized Constrained Games in Farm Planning

T. Kawaguchi and Y. Maruyama

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1972, vol. 54, issue 4_Part_1, 591-602

Abstract: Constrained games arise when the mixed strategies of a finite rectangular game are subject to further constraints in the form of linear inequalities. Such games permit more realistic and convenient formulation of many decision problems. This paper offers a generalization of the constrained game model which widens the scope of game-theoretic approaches in farm planning. Solution procedures are proposed for Savage's minimax regret, Hurwicz's pessimism-optimism index, and the "Wald-maximax" and "Wald-Savage" criteria. It is shown that the proposed approaches can handle uncertainty in the inequality constraints. An application to a farm planning problem concludes the paper.

Date: 1972
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