Perfect Aggregation and Disaggregation of Complementarity Problems

Quirino Paris

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1980, vol. 62, issue 4, 681-688

Abstract: Perfect aggregation of linear complementarity problems is possible under the notion of constrained consistency. This notion—which also can be interpreted as a disaggregation rule—requires restrictions on the domain of the micro variables to be aggregated. The linear complementarity problem includes symmetric and asymmetric quadratic programming, linear programming, and two-person, nonzero-sum games. Hence, all these mathematical programming structures admit consistent aggregation and disaggregation of their primal and dual variables.

Date: 1980
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:62:y:1980:i:4:p:681-688.

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