The Political Economy of Agricultural Credit: The Case of Bolivi

Jerry R. Ladman and Ronald L. Tinnermeier

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1981, vol. 63, issue 1, 66-72

Abstract: A theoretical framework is established to show that agricultural credit programs in less developed countries can be used for political purposes because of (a) government-controlled supply; (b) implicit income transfers associated with concessionary interest rates, delinquency, and inflation that can be used as patronage for politically influential borrowers; and (c) ease of implementation under guise of economic objectives. The framework is applied to Bolivia. Within that country's political context, large income transfers to a few influential farmers strongly suggest the importance of political factors in credit allocation with consequent effects on income distribution, development, and debilitation of financial institutions.

Date: 1981
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