Price Trends at Livestock Auctions

Steven T. Buccola

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1982, vol. 64, issue 1, 63-69

Abstract: Auction bidders may pursue a large number of reasonable bidding strategies, including those that are risk-neutral and risk-averse. Risk-averse bidders are especially tempted by the auction process to discriminate against themselves, that is, to offer prices close to their reservation prices or target prices. Self-discrimination, in turn, usually implies that quality-corrected prices of individual lots trend downward as the sale proceeds. The empirical evidence for downtrending prices at selected yearling steer sales is examined. Implications are then drawn for auction pricing efficiency and equity.

Date: 1982
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