Distributional Constraints on Acceptance of Nonpoint Pollution Controls

William M. Park and Leonard Shabman

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1982, vol. 64, issue 3, 455-462

Abstract: An economically efficient, nonpoint pollution control strategy for a multijurisdictional 208 area may result in a benefit-cost distribution that will prohibit its acceptance. Vesting financial authorities in a regional water quality management agency would allow for implementation of a local compensation scheme designed to facilitate acceptance. Such a scheme would involve raising revenues from water quality beneficiaries that would, in turn, be paid as inducements for implementation of nonpoint control practices. These propositions are first defended with a theoretical argument. Then a linear programming model is applied for an empirical case analysis.

Date: 1982
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:64:y:1982:i:3:p:455-462.

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