Anti-Hoarding Laws: A Stock Condemnation Reconsidered

Brian Wright () and Jeffrey C. Williams

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1984, vol. 66, issue 4, 447-455

Abstract: Economists have regarded anti-hoarding laws as irrational reactions to nonexistent monopoly in the storage of grain. This paper shows that anti-hoarding laws cannot be rationally directed against a monopolistic storer, for he will always store less, not more, than would be stored under competition. But seemingly perverse competitive storage, in the form of excessive stockholding, can arise when a price ceiling distorts the market. Additional public storage exacerbates this perverse private behavior, and may even induce behavior that appears to be active market manipulation. Under such circumstances, anti-hoarding laws can be desirable second-best measures.

Date: 1984
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:66:y:1984:i:4:p:447-455.

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