A Dynamic Analysis of Marketing Orders, Voting, and Welfare

Peter Berck and Jeffrey Perloff

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1985, vol. 67, issue 3, 487-496

Abstract: This paper presents a dynamic model of how profit-maximizing farmers would vote on marketing order rules given that new firms will enter, based on rational expectations (perfect foresight) about the path profits follow. Early entrants make large short-run gains while, in the long run, marginal firms break even. Welfare analyses under a dynamic model differ substantially from the static analyses normally reported.

Date: 1985
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Working Paper: A dynamic analysis of marketing orders, voting, and welfare (1984)
Working Paper: A Dynamic Analysis of Marketing Orders, Voting, and Welfare (1984)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:67:y:1985:i:3:p:487-496.

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