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Estimating the Market for Tomatoes

Rafi Melnick () and Haim Shalit ()

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1985, vol. 67, issue 3, 573-582

Abstract: An econometric model of the market for tomatoes in Israel is developed to take into account the distortions brought about by the marketing board and intermediaries. The existence of monopoly and monopsony power is hypothesized by analyzing the middlemen's optimal behavior. Being compelled by the marketing board to purchase all produce, wholesalers exert monopsony power by reducing quantities marketed to consumers by selling surpluses to the marketing board at the minimum price. The empirical results confirm the existence of strong monopsony power together with weak monopoly power in that market.

Date: 1985
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Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:67:y:1985:i:3:p:573-582.