To Violate or Not Violate the Law: An Example from Egyptian Agriculture

Dyaa K. Abdou, B. Delworth Gardner and Richard Green

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1986, vol. 68, issue 1, 120-126

Abstract: Egyptian agriculture is heavily regulated by laws and administrative regulations. This paper explores some of the economic implications of two laws that are widely violated: the land allotment to cotton and the imposed quota for rice. Logit and probit models are utilized to assess factors which are associated with law violations in two villages. Violators of both laws tend to be poorer, have less owned land, have fewer number of land pieces, have fewer cattle, and are located nearer the free village markets than the nonviolators.

Date: 1986
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1241656 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:68:y:1986:i:1:p:120-126.

Access Statistics for this article

American Journal of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Madhu Khanna, Brian E. Roe, James Vercammen and JunJie Wu

More articles in American Journal of Agricultural Economics from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().