Oligopolistic Behavior by Public Agencies in International Trade: The World Wheat Market

Philip L. Paarlberg and Philip Abbott

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1986, vol. 68, issue 3, 528-542

Abstract: A model of the world wheat market is presented which treats public policies as endogenous. The oligopolistic nature of international wheat trade is captured by assuming policy makers form conjectures on the slope of the excess demand function they face and use that information to determine domestic and trade policies. The policies reflect differing influences of political interest groups. A U.S. crop shortfall scenario illustrates the different results with endogenous policies compared to the traditional model.

Date: 1986
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:68:y:1986:i:3:p:528-542.

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