Optimal Governing Instrument, Operation Level, and Enforcement in Natural Resource Regulation: The Case of the Fishery

Lee G. Anderson and Dwight R. Lee

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1986, vol. 68, issue 3, 678-690

Abstract: Most regulation studies have used industry output or inputs as the control variable(s), but these are only indirectly controlled by government action through its choice of governing instrument, enforcement procedure, and penalty structure and the operational level of each. A model is developed which demonstrates how profit-maximizing firms will react to these control variables taking into account the benefits (extra production) and costs (possible penalties) of noncompliance and the ability to avoid detection of noncompliance. The optimal operation level for two sets of control variables is derived and discussed.

Date: 1986
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:68:y:1986:i:3:p:678-690.

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