Rent Seeking in International Trade: The Great Tomato War

Maury Bredahl, Andrew Schmitz and Jimmye S. Hillman

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1987, vol. 69, issue 1, 1-10

Abstract: This paper presents a model of international rent-seeking activities by producers in both exporting and importing nations. The model is applied to the winter vegetable trade between the United States and Mexico. An analysis is made of the attempts to form export/import coalitions. Reasons for these failures are given. Due to past failures to impede trade, essentially free trade in winter vegetables between the two countries exists.

Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:69:y:1987:i:1:p:1-10.

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