The Political Economy of Western Water Finance: Cost Allocation and the Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah Project

Jon R. Miller

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1987, vol. 69, issue 2, 303-310

Abstract: A common hypothesis is that federal water agencies pursue continued appropriations with little consideration of national economic efficiency. In the mid-1980s, faced with a vote on a supplemental municipal and industrial water repayment contract on the Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah Project, the Bureau of Reclamation confirmed this hypothesis. Through modifications in cost allocation procedures, the bureau shifted costs from municipal and industrial water to hydropower and irrigation. The result of this action was retention of the irrigation purpose in the Bonneville Unit, which would have been unjustified under previous cost allocation procedures.

Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:69:y:1987:i:2:p:303-310.

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