On Moral Hazard and Cost Sharing under Sharecropping

Pranab Bardhan and Nirvikar Singh

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1987, vol. 69, issue 2, 382-383

Abstract: In this article we show that when the tenant's input use is not observable by the landlord, there will be cost sharing at the margin (instead of a lump sum transfer) if the standard model is extended to include cases of imperfection and interlinkage of transactions in rural markets, thus making the opportunity cost of inputs different for the landlord and the tenant.

Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:69:y:1987:i:2:p:382-383.

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