Subjective Probabilities and Scoring Rules: Experimental Evidence

Robert G. Nelson and David Bessler ()

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1989, vol. 71, issue 2, 363-369

Abstract: This paper provides an articulation of the theory of scoring rules that leads to a testable hypothesis about strategic behavior under an improper rule. Subjects in a laboratory setting were first screened for linear utility in the range of rewards. Those that passed this test were used as subjects in a probability forecasting experiment. Results suggest that theory holds when subjects forecast over many periods, although inexperienced subjects may fail to exploit the dominant strategy in the initial periods.

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:71:y:1989:i:2:p:363-369.

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