Vote Trading on Farm Legislation in the U.S. House

David Abler ()

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1989, vol. 71, issue 3, 583-591

Abstract: Several farm groups do not command enough votes in the U.S. House of Representatives to pass their programs without the help of others. This study investigates the extent of vote trading by these groups. Both vote trading among these groups and between them and representatives of the poor are examined. Farm legislation from 1985–86 is studied. The results show an active coalition among tobacco, sugar, peanut, and dairy farmers, as well as the poor. Wheat, rice, and cotton farmers are much less active in the coalition, while feed grain farmers are not in it at all.

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:71:y:1989:i:3:p:583-591.

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