On the Political Economy of Public Good Inputs in Agriculture

Harry de Gorter () and David Zilberman

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1990, vol. 72, issue 1, 131-137

Abstract: The paper analyzes two elements in explaining and prescribing the level of cost-reducing “public good” inputs in agriculture: the distribution of political influence and the economic properties of markets. The incidence of costs/benefits of alternative cost-sharing arrangements between taxpayers and producers is compared to the social optimal and competitive outcomes. Although one group could lose, we focus only on situations of a Pareto improvement. The model predicts why some sectors have relatively more public versus private research funding and why the degree of underinvestment varies across sectors. The observed underinvestment in agriculture may be due to the political power of farmers, inelastic demand, and highly productive public good inputs.

Date: 1990
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:72:y:1990:i:1:p:131-137.

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