A Game-Theoretic Model of Endogenous Public Policies

John Beghin ()

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1990, vol. 72, issue 1, 138-148

Abstract: Public policies are the equilibrium outcome of a cooperative game among interest groups and the policy maker. This study stresses the interdependence between policies and players' bargaining strengths and derives their comparative statics with respect to a changing economic environment. It also provides a specification of behavioral equations consistent with the underlying bargaining process. An analysis of the political economy of food and agricultural price policies in Senegal illustrates the proposed framework.

Date: 1990
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Working Paper: Game-Theoretic Model of Endogenous Public Policies, A (1990)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:72:y:1990:i:1:p:138-148.

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