The Economics of Reentry Regulation of Pesticides

Erik Lichtenberg, Robert C. Spear and David Zilberman

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1993, vol. 75, issue 4, 946-958

Abstract: Government agencies frequently try to protect the public from industrial hazards by separating the two in time and/or space. This paper develops a methodology for one such policy, reentry regulation of pesticides. Re-entry regulation is shown to provide a rational incentive for preventive applications of pesticides, a practice usually attributed to risk aversion or inadequate information. The tradeoffs between farm worker poisonings and lost grower revenue are shown to be substantial. Weather-dependent, location-specific reentry regulation appears superior to the uniform regulation now in effect.

Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:75:y:1993:i:4:p:946-958.

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