In Search of Rational Government: What Political Preference Function Studies Measure and Assume

David S. Bullock

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1994, vol. 76, issue 3, 347-361

Abstract: Political preference function (PPF) studies assume that policy-making can be described by a mathematical problem in which a rational government maximizes a function of interest groups' welfares. The purpose of my paper is to explain in-depth ramifications of PPF study assumptions and methodology. PPF studies that attempt to measure interest group political power do so by measuring marginal rates of transformation along a Pareto frontier. One can estimate political power with a PPF only if observed policies are Pareto-efficient, which may depend on the assumed number of interest groups and policy instruments. Marginal rates of transformation need not reveal anything meaningful about interest group political power, and may incorrectly measure the direction of transfers.

Date: 1994
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1243648 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:76:y:1994:i:3:p:347-361.

Access Statistics for this article

American Journal of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Madhu Khanna, Brian E. Roe, James Vercammen and JunJie Wu

More articles in American Journal of Agricultural Economics from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().