Valuing Food Safety in Experimental Auction Markets

Dermot Hayes, Jason Shogren, Seung Youll Shin and James B. Kliebenstein

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1995, vol. 77, issue 1, 40-53

Abstract: In this paper, we value food safety in a nonhypothetical setting—experimental auction markets. First, subjects underestimate the relatively low probabilities of food-borne illness. Second, measures of value are within a relatively flat range across a wide range of risks, even with repeated market experience and full information on the objective probability and severity of illness, suggesting subjects rely on prior perceptions. Third, marginal willingness to pay decreases as risk increases, suggesting that the perceived quality of new information can affect the weight the individuals place on the information. Finally, pathogen-specific values seem to act as surrogates for general food safety preferences.

Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (134)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1243887 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Valuing Food Safety in Experimental Auction Markets (1995)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:77:y:1995:i:1:p:40-53.

Access Statistics for this article

American Journal of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Madhu Khanna, Brian E. Roe, James Vercammen and JunJie Wu

More articles in American Journal of Agricultural Economics from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().